<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"><channel><title>HeaderHawk: client-side security</title><description>Articles on client-side security from HeaderHawk: how the browser&apos;s own reports behave in practice, what real skimming incidents left behind, and what HeaderHawk does with what arrives.</description><link>https://headerhawk.com/</link><language>en-us</language><item><title>Beyond CSP: the other reports browsers send, and how to sample them</title><link>https://headerhawk.com/blog/browser-report-types-and-sampling/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://headerhawk.com/blog/browser-report-types-and-sampling/</guid><description>Browsers report broken security policies, deprecated APIs, failed requests and crashes through the same API as CSP. What each type tells you, and how to keep the noisy ones affordable.</description><pubDate>Sat, 19 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>reporting-api</category><category>csp-reports</category><category>client-side-security</category></item><item><title>You&apos;d never ship code to a server with no controls. So why the browser?</title><link>https://headerhawk.com/blog/defence-in-depth-stops-at-the-browser/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://headerhawk.com/blog/defence-in-depth-stops-at-the-browser/</guid><description>We wrap our servers in layer after layer of controls, then ship the same code to a machine we do not run and add almost nothing. What the browser layer is, and how to start it.</description><pubDate>Sat, 19 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>client-side-security</category><category>csp-reports</category></item><item><title>What CSP and script hash reports would have shown during the polyfill.io attack</title><link>https://headerhawk.com/blog/polyfill-io-supply-chain-attack-csp-report/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://headerhawk.com/blog/polyfill-io-supply-chain-attack-csp-report/</guid><description>In 2024 a CDN embedded on 100,000+ sites changed owners and began serving malicious code to mobile visitors. What a violation report would have shown, what a hash report would not, and why.</description><pubDate>Thu, 10 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>incidents</category><category>supply-chain</category><category>script-hashes</category><category>csp-reports</category><category>client-side-security</category></item><item><title>How Magecart skimmers show up in CSP violation reports</title><link>https://headerhawk.com/blog/magecart-skimmers-csp-violation-reports/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://headerhawk.com/blog/magecart-skimmers-csp-violation-reports/</guid><description>Card skimmers arrive as a new script, a modified one, an inline handler or a fake payment form, and send data to lookalike hosts. Which CSP report each variant produces, and which produce none.</description><pubDate>Tue, 01 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>magecart</category><category>csp-reports</category><category>incidents</category></item><item><title>How CSP script hash reporting works with report-sha256</title><link>https://headerhawk.com/blog/csp-report-sha256-script-hash-reporting/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://headerhawk.com/blog/csp-report-sha256-script-hash-reporting/</guid><description>Add &apos;report-sha256&apos; to a Content-Security-Policy and Chrome and Edge send a hash of each script they fetch. How to set it up, what the report contains, and where it helps.</description><pubDate>Thu, 20 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>script-hashes</category><category>pci-dss</category><category>csp-reports</category></item><item><title>What a CSP report would have shown during the Ticketmaster breach</title><link>https://headerhawk.com/blog/ticketmaster-inbenta-breach-csp-report/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://headerhawk.com/blog/ticketmaster-inbenta-breach-csp-report/</guid><description>A vendor-hosted chat widget sat on Ticketmaster&apos;s payment page. Modified at the vendor, it skimmed cards for four months. The report a policy on that page would have sent, and what it could not see.</description><pubDate>Tue, 11 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>incidents</category><category>magecart</category><category>supply-chain</category><category>csp-reports</category><category>client-side-security</category></item><item><title>What a CSP report would have shown during the British Airways breach</title><link>https://headerhawk.com/blog/british-airways-magecart-breach-csp-report/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://headerhawk.com/blog/british-airways-magecart-breach-csp-report/</guid><description>For 15 days in 2018, 22 lines added to a script on ba.com copied card details to baways.com. The connect-src report that names a host like that on its first request, and what CSP leaves unsolved.</description><pubDate>Wed, 29 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>incidents</category><category>magecart</category><category>csp-reports</category><category>client-side-security</category></item><item><title>Why CSP reports fill up with browser extension and bot noise</title><link>https://headerhawk.com/blog/csp-report-noise-browser-extensions-bots/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://headerhawk.com/blog/csp-report-noise-browser-extensions-bots/</guid><description>Browser extensions, crawlers and data: URIs trigger CSP violation reports your site didn&apos;t cause. How HeaderHawk identifies that noise and keeps it out of your alerts.</description><pubDate>Thu, 16 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>noise</category><category>alerting</category><category>csp-reports</category></item></channel></rss>